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The sciences are not only the most sophisticated human 
enterprise of knowledge gathering, they are at the same 
time epistemically self-conscious to a considerable degree. 
Assessments of the epistemic status of data, inferences 
and theories play an important role in the very practice of 
science, which therefore includes a wealth of epistemic 
notions, norms and considerations. In one sense of the 
expression “epistemology of science”, some sort of an 
epistemology is thus included in scientific practice. This 
epistemology is usually captured under the heading of 
methodology, and its explication – e.g. concerning the 
standards of confirmation or theory choice – has also been 
a central business of the philosophy of science. Still, there 
are further epistemological questions about scientific 
knowledge claims that are typically not addressed within 
scientific practice. These include topics such as the 
underdetermination of theories by all evidence, the no-
miracle argument, or the theory-dependence of observa-
tions. In the present paper, I will discuss the notion of 
justification that is operative in science and thus try to shed 
some light on the relation between the two epistemologies. 
1. Two notions of justification 
A central activity of any epistemic practice is the assess-
ment of knowledge claims as justified or not justified (viz. 
as epistemically acceptable or not acceptable)1. In general 
epistemology, two notions of justification are often distin-
guished. First, for a cogniser to be justified in her beliefs, 
she has to be rational with respect to her beliefs. This 
means that she has to possess good reasons for holding 
them and to be able to respond adequately to challenges. 
This notion of justification is often taken to capture what it 
is to be epistemically responsible, viz. to fulfil the duties 
one has concerning one’s believing. Therefore I will call it 
the deontological notion of justification. Second, on the 
alethic notion, a cogniser is justified if her beliefs are likely 
to be true, e.g. if her methods of belief formation are reli-
able and thus generally truth-conducive. Justification in 
this sense is conceptually tied to indicating likely truth. But 
this opposition of notions does not mean that deontological 
justification has nothing to do with truth, since a reason for 
a belief is something that can be taken to speak for the 
belief’s truth. Still, the assumption behind the distinction is 
that, in deviation from a long tradition in epistemology, it is 
not conceptually or metaphysically necessary that what is 
rational to believe is therefore also likely to be true (or the 
other way round). In a world ruled by a Cartesian demon, 
one can be fully rational and fulfil the epistemic duties 
without the beliefs being likely to be true. And for someone 
with a rare but reliable faculty of clairvoyance, the thus 
formed beliefs can always be true without the subject 
being rationally entitled to hold them (Cp. Alston 1998). 
The deontological and alethic notions are therefore dis-
tinct. 
In the light of the two notions of justification, scientific 
justification seems to be largely deontological. Scientific 
claims in general count as justified or challenged to the 
extent that specific reasons can be adduced. A choice 
                                                     
1 Since I am here only interested in the structure of the scientific epistemic as-
sessment, I will not distinguish between justification and acceptance, even 
though one can argue that the epistemic attitudes that are licensed either by 
acceptability or justification – namely acceptance or belief – are different.  
between alternative theories, for instance, is scientifically 
acceptable if it balances conditions like empirical accuracy, 
internal and external consistency, broad scope, simplicity, 
and fruitfulness (Kuhn 1977, 321-322). It is not made to 
depend conceptually on the actual truth-conduciveness of 
this set of standards. On reflection, this does not come as 
a great surprise. Deontological justification, by definition, 
has to be one that can be followed by cognisers, and that 
can thus be operative in an epistemic practice. In contrast 
to this, alethic justification refers to the actual likelihood for 
truth, which is not what is in general transparent to cognis-
ers. It therefore typically cannot be followed in a straight-
forward way in one’s believing, and hence cannot be di-
rectly implemented in an epistemic practice. 
Still, the scientific notion of justification is special in at 
least two respects. First, deontological conceptions of 
justification in general epistemology often go with internal-
ism. Since a cogniser can only have the epistemic duties 
that she can fulfil, the reasons for or against believing that 
she might have to adduce have to be accessible to her. In 
line with the strong individualist emphasis of traditional 
epistemology, this condition of accessibility has typically 
been spelt out in terms of privileged access by the individ-
ual subject of cognition. The prototypical states and proc-
esses that are, in this sense, accessible include the sub-
ject’s perceptual experiences, her memory and her infer-
ences. In contrast to this, the scientific notion of justifica-
tion pays tribute to the fact that science is a communal 
project of knowledge gathering. For a theory to be accept-
able for a scientist, not only the reasons accessible to her 
by introspection, but any reasons accessible to the scien-
tific community have to be taken into account. She can be 
blamed e.g. for ignoring published evidence that contra-
dicts the theory. Since only the extensive division of labour 
between scientists across history, different subdisciplines 
and different specialisations (as experimenters, theorists 
etc.) makes today’s scientific findings humanly achievable, 
scientists in their believing have to rely on results the 
scientific assessment of which they cannot entirely redo by 
themselves. This mutual dependence leads to some form 
of externalism: Scientific results count as accessible to a 
believer even though they cannot be comprehensively 
checked by her on the basis of what she has privileged 
access to.  
Second, the question whether processes of producing 
results are reliable is regularly posed. This applies in par-
ticular to observations and the generation of empirical 
results. Since standard alethic accounts of justification also 
refer to the reliability of processes of belief formation, one 
might wonder whether scientific practice does not incorpo-
rate here the alethic notion. I will address this issue by 
looking more closely at the scientific standards for as-
sessing the reliability of observation results. 
2. Assessing the reliability of observation 
results  
Observational data come in a wide variety in the sciences. 
At one end of the spectrum (or better at one end of a multi-
dimensional continuum), there are empirical results that 
are obtained by highly complex, extensive experiments. 
One such result is the finding that solar neutrinos change 




their ‘flavour’ on their way to the earth, which has been 
shown by data gained at the Sudbury Neutrino Observa-
tory in Canada (Ahmad et al. 2002). The data are obtained 
from a detector that is situated in a copper mine 2000 
metres below the surface. About 1000 tons of heavy water 
were deposited there, with sparks occurring in it being 
registered by photomultiplier tubes. In order to assess the 
data as reliable, a wide range of considerations and provi-
sions had to be made. For example, the detector is placed 
in the mine in order to shield off cosmic rays, and it is 
additionally surrounded by 7000 tons of ordinary water to 
absorb neutrons and gamma rays from the rock. The data 
have been collected over a period of more than a year, 
and have considerably been processed and analysed. For 
instance, the neutron background had to be subtracted, 
which had before been determined by calibrating the de-
tector with an artificial neutron source. Altogether, from the 
more than 300 million initially triggered events, about 1000 
have been selected as relevant data base (Ahmad et al. 
2001).  
In cases like this, a large number of both empirical and 
theoretical considerations about the process of data gen-
eration and selection is altogether adduced to assess the 
final results.2 This shows that science is epistemically self-
conscious: What one knows scientifically about the reliabil-
ity of the generation of scientific findings enters into the 
epistemic assessment of these findings. But this does not 
mean that science is here committed to the alethic notion 
of justification. While the reasons concern the truth-condu-
civeness of the observation processes, it is only reasons 
insofar as they are accessible to the scientific community 
that matter. For example, the theoretical understanding of 
the different processes of neutrino interaction are of cen-
tral importance for gaining the result. But it is the standard 
theories that enter here as conditions of justification, not 
the real processes that take place. If the two came apart, 
i.e. if, in retrospect, we would find that physicists were in 
error about the neutrino interactions, we would still think 
that they were scientifically justified in drawing their con-
clusions, if the error is not of their fault. But this is to say 
that the deontological notion of justification is dominant. 
The deontological notion makes one expect that justifi-
cation is defeasible. An observation that is acceptable at 
some point of time might be judged to be unreliable as 
further knowledge on its generation is acquired. Observa-
tions from the other end of the above mentioned spectrum 
can illustrate this defeasibility.  
This end is occupied by simple direct perceptions of sci-
entifically interesting phenomena (the intermediate contin-
uum being filled with, among others, perceptions made 
with instruments and results from measuring instruments 
or imaging techniques)3. Results from direct perception are 
usually accepted without further reasons being given for 
their reliability. When scientists report that they have seen, 
in their laboratory, a litmus paper turn pink, they are not 
asked to give reasons for assuming that their sensory 
experiences are in general good indicators as to the colour 
changes that occur or that the conditions for the observa-
tion have been favourable. Instead, the results are taken at 
face value. 
Still, the acceptance is defeasible and can be under-
mined by specific reasons that question the reliability of 
particular perceptions. This can be illustrated by Galileo’s 
discussion of the tower-experiment. A stone falling from 
                                                     
2 Cp. Shapere 1982 and Galison 1987, Chap. 4 for cases with a similar role for 
theoretical and empirical considerations. 
3 For a discussion of the scientific standards for assessing the reliability of 
such observational results, see Adam (2002), chapt. 5. 
the top of a tower is perceived to fall in a straight line. 
However, according to Copernicus’ theory, the earth and 
with it the stone also revolve. Therefore, the stone is taken 
really to move mixed straight and circular. The direct per-
ception, taken at face value, contradicts this consequence 
of Copernicus’ theory. Following Copernicus, Galileo how-
ever argues that with respect to real motion, direct percep-
tions are unreliable. This is supported by assumptions 
about the perception of motion. Galileo assumes that an 
object appears to be moving only if, in order to keep track 
of the object, the observer has to move her eyes. But 
insofar as observer and object move uniformly, the eyes 
do not have to be moved to follow the object. Therefore, 
only the motion of the object relative to the observer, not 
the common motion is perceived, and the direct impression 
of the falling stone does not reliably indicate the stone’s 
real motion (Galileo 1632, 248-250). 
The scientific policy concerning direct perceptions then 
seems to be that they count as prima facie acceptable, but 
the acceptance can be undermined by specific reasons as 
to them being unreliable. Again, it would be wrong to count 
these standards as alethic. Justification is not made to 
depend on direct perception actually being reliable, but on 
the scientific availability of specific reasons against the 
reliability. Also in this case, the scientific standards of 
justification are deontological and refer to all scientifically 
accessible reasons. 
At the same time, some pertinent epistemological ques-
tions are not addressed within this scientific practice. Why 
is it advisable to accept direct perceptions at face value 
unless specific reasons speak against their reliability, while 
more elaborate observation results are in need of substan-
tial empirical and theoretical underpinning? I take it that an 
answer would have to refer to the different roles that the 
relative dependence and independence of observations 
from theories play for the empirical basis of science. While 
the – arguably – largely theory-independent direct percep-
tions allow for a neutral input to science, the empirical 
basis of science is enormously extended when theories 
guide and validate more sophisticated observational re-
sults (see Adam 2002). But the details of this answer 
notwithstanding, an answer of this type would address the 
question whether the scientific enterprise, proceeding as 
specified by its internal methodological rules, is on the 
whole likely to find the truth. In other words, it would as-
sess scientific claims according to the alethic notion of 
justification. 
3. Conclusions 
All in all, the scientific epistemic practice on the one hand 
includes a deontological notion of justification. Yet the 
notion is not internalist, since reasons that are communally 
accessible and also concern the reliability of the worldly 
generation of scientific findings are relevant. On the other 
hand, the discussion of observational results has shown 
that a number of epistemological issues are not addressed 
within science. These can be subsumed under the ques-
tion whether the scientific practice as characterised by its 
internal epistemic rules is on the whole likely to lead to true 
claims. It seems to me that established discussions on 
topics such as the underdetermination of theories by em-
pirical evidence, the no-miracle argument or the theory-
dependence of observation are best viewed as working 
largely on this question. But to ask for the truth-conducive-
ness of the scientific method is to ask whether scientific 
claims are justified in the alethic sense.  
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